In major securities fraud cases against the likes Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and others, the plaintiffs’ lawyers who pocketed hundreds of millions of dollars in contingency fees were, for the most part, representing state and municipal pension funds. Just to be clear, I’m talking about firms like Coughlin Stoia, Milberg, Bernstein Litowitz, Barrack, Rodos, Bernstein Liebhard, Berman DeValerio, and others, many of whom are mentioned in the 2008 SCAS Top 50.
So how did these law firms get themselves retained by the pension funds in the first place? The answer, of course, is money and schmoozing (sometimes euphemized as “lobbying” or “marketing”). This post is about the schmoozing. The money is a much more complicated issue which we will continue to develop in future posts, but for a taste, see Neil Weinberg and Dan Fisher’s illuminating 2004 Forbes article, The Class Action Industrial Complex.
Unseemly and often improper relationships between state pension fund officials and money managers are no longer a very closely held secret. The part played by securities class action firms in facilitating and profiting from these relationships, however, has remained more or less well-guarded. Since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995, the courts’ selection of lead plaintiffs in securities class action lawsuits has been determined largely by the size of the prospective plaintiffs’ losses.
Pension Fund Monitoring Agreements
When equity or debt investments substantially decline in value, those holding the largest investments obviously lose the most. Thus it should hardly surprise anyone that large institutional funds and investors have become the plaintiffs of choice for firms seeking lead counsel status (and therewith control over the distribution of enormous contingency fees). And among these institutional investors, state and municipal pension funds are the most prolific lead plaintiffs in large securities class actions.
With a few exceptions, pension fund officials generally don’t decide sua sponte to pursue a class action lawsuit against a public company when in most cases the shares they own in that company comprise just a tiny percentage of their overall investment portfolio. Instead, they hire these very same plaintiffs firms to “monitor” their portfolio for losses resulting from potential cases of securities fraud. As it turns out, these law firms have monitoring agreements with many pension funds (see Judge Rakoff’s decision in the Merrill Lynch subprime case this May discussed on Law.com.
When they find a securities fraud case to pursue (which is generally just a matter of piggybacking on an SEC action), they rifle through the portfolios of the many funds they “monitor” to find the most attractive plaintiff or group of plaintiffs to bring to the court house.
Pay-to-Play
Everyone knows the plaintiffs firms are major fund raisers, bundlers and contributors to the campaigns of governors and senators. Fewer people are aware of their substantial and unregulated contributions to organizations like the Democratic Attorney Generals Association (DAGA). Because DAGA is a 527 PAC, contributions to these groups are uncapped and only get reported to IRS (and, conspicuously, not to the FEC or any other election oversight agency). When DAGA holds an event, the big securities class action firms all attend and pay for this conference/soirée with very large checks. I’m guessing the money is probably earmarked with the firm’s name on it to eventually trickle down to a particular attorney general’s reelection fund.
Partners at these law firms regularly attend such events, and also routinely hire former governors, retired pension fund officials, former comptrollers, ex-attorneys general, and others to schmooze with people they may know there on the firm’s behalf. Other examples of State AG related political organizations that enjoy hosting such “conferences” are the National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) and the Conference of Western Attorneys General.
And when all else fails, what do the law firms do when they want to be retained by a pension fund but don’t have anyone on the payroll with friends who have some influence over a state pension system? They host their own gala, of course!
Law Firms’ “Investor Protection” Forums
The theme of the ball is usually something generic like “protecting investors” and if you’re a government official why not stay at the Waldorf and eat caviar while listening to some big-name keynote speaker? And since “investor protection” is in their job description, what’s so wrong about spending taxpayer money to schmooze with potential big campaign donors? Junket… what junket?
So who does the firm invite to these events? People they and their lobbyists met at other conferences for one. High profile speakers will be there to lend the whole affair a whiff of credibility. The guests of honor are obviously the state officials looking for campaign cash… Governors, Attorneys General, Comptrollers and others of this ilk. Lest we forget, friendly investment managers will attend as well, and for a reasonable fee would be happy to manage a few billion of their pension fund’s dollars. Like the law firm hosting the affair, these private fund managers would love to raise, donate and bundle cash for the campaigns of those who would entrust them with their pensioners’ cash.
So the plaintiffs’ lawyers are actually throwing parties which allow corruptible state officials to meet and socialize with corrupting money managers. Plus they get to pitch their “investment monitoring” service as a way for these officials to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to protect the state’s money from corporate fraud. And so generous are they that the lawyers will offer to access their pension funds’ investment portfolio whenever they want… pro bono!
Interested in attending one of these events yourself? Then you better hurry up and get an invitation: http://www.forumii.org/
Filed under: Law & Politics, Opinion, Bernstein, institutional investors, Milberg, pay-to-play, pension funds, PSLRA, securities